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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
replace capital assets.5 In businesses, such as temporary exhibitions,
where the initial investment is not intended to be replaced, obviously,
depreciation is not allowable as an expense to ascertain the profits.6
The courts have followed a logically consistent pattern in defining
the word "profits" to include the expense of depreciation, since profits
are produced by capital and if no allowance was made for the replace-
ment of capital then profits could no longer be accumulated. In the
instant case, the contract itself is al obligation and therefore an expense,
but the word "profit" is used to make the pension expense one of
contingent liability; a type of unsecured claim.
CRIMINAL LAW
THE PROBLEM OF SIMILAR OFFENSES
L., a sales department manager, feloniously took goods from his
own and other departments and removed them, during and after store
hours, from the establishment where he was employed. He had no
authority to remove goods from the premises without procuring a
requisition. L. delivered the goods to G., who knew that they had not
been legally obtained. G. subsequently sold them, sharing proceeds
with L. Charged with grand larceny, L. pleaded guilty. G. was later
tried and convicted for receiving stolen goods. Motion for new trial
on grounds that verdict was contrary to law and not sustained by
sufficient evidence overruled. Ruling assigned as error. Conviction,
reversed: Statute' defines distinct offenses of feloniously receiving
stolen goods and feloniously receiving embezzled goods. Where affi-
davit charged receipt of stolen goods and evidence showed receipt of
embezzled goods, the variance requires reversal. Gentry v. State,
Ind.- , 61 N.E. (2d) 641 (1945).
This case presents the anomalous situation of a defendant charged
with and convicted of receiving stolen goods from a person who plead
5. Bank of Morgan v. Reid, 27 Ga. App. 123, 107 S.E. 555 (1921);
Fricke v. Angemeier, 53 Ind. App. 140, 101 N.E. 329 (1913); Burk
v. Ottawa Gas and Elec., Company, 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912).
But see Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Grand Rapids G. H. and M.
Ry Co., 7 F. Supp. 511, 520 (W.D. Mich. 1931).
6. Eyster v. Centennial Board of Finance, 94 U.S. 500 (1876).
1. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) § 10-3097: "Receiving Stolen
Goods. Whoever buys, receives, conceals, or aids in the concealing
of, anything of value, which has been stolen, taken by robbers,
embezzled, or obtained by false pretenses, knowing the same to
have been stolen, taken by robbers, embezzled, or obtained by
false pretenses, shall, . . . "
The problem presented in the principal case would not arise
in any of the states cited in the Burns' list of comparative legis-
lation. Under a similar statute, the Ohio court has held aver-
ment of the character of the offense by which the property was
originally wrongfully obtained unnecessary. Whiting v. State,
48. O.S. 220 (1891). The other legislation is not strictly parallel:
Idaho has a separate statute defining receipt of embezzled goods;
Illinois and Oregon classify embezzlement as larceny and goods
obtained by embezzlement are "stolen"; California and New York
have theft legislation and the property would be "stolen" regard-
less of the species of theft involved.
[Vol. 21
NOTES AND COMMENTS
guilty2 of larceny escaping initial liability3 because the court deter-
mined that the original taker had not "stolen" the goods but had
"embezzled" them. Since there was no evidence from which the jury
could find larceny,4 "stolen goods" had not been received; a material
2. "Nobody had talked to him about the difference between larceny
and embezlement." Brief for Appellant, p. 70, Gentry v. State,
- Ind. -, 61 N.E. (2d) 641 (1945). With the problem pre-
sented in the text, compare the effect of an improvident plea of
guilty made through mistake of law concerning the offense com-
mitted: Overruling a timely motion to permit withdrawal of the
plea stating that the defendant was not guilty of the crime charged
would be an abuse of discretion. Capps v. State, 200 Ind. 4, 161
N.E. 8 (1928). Motion for new trial will not be entertained.
Meyers v. State, 156 Ind. 388, 59 N.E. 1052 (1901). Appeal may
be made, however, to test sufficiency of charge to which the
plea was addressed. Pattee v. State, 109 Ind. 545, 10 N.E. 421
(1886). In Indiana, no appeal would lie on behalf of the state.
The error of law does not prevent an effective plea of doublejeopardy to the correct charge for the same transaction. State
v. Morrison, 165 Ind. 461, 75 N.E. 968 (1905). A writ of coram
nobis might be available. Trattner v. State. 185 Ind. 188, 113
N.E. 243 (1916); Orfield, "Write of Error Coram Nobis" (1932)
8 Ind. L. J. 247. Granting a writ of coran nobis would consti-
tute a waiver of the plea of double jeopardy. Kleihege v. State,
202 Ind. 546, 177 N.E. 59 (1931). It remains unlikely that any
attempt would be made to contest a lighter sentence, e.g. larceny
rather than embezzlement.
3. Motion for new trial constitutes a waiver of the plea of doublejeopardy. State v. Balseley, 159 Ind. 395, 65 N.E. 185 (1902).
Statute of limitations is tolled during pendency of the motion.
4. "In our opinion only one reasonable inference can be drawn from
the facts in this case . . . that the merchandise . . . was em-
bezzled." Principal case at 641. The statement of facts given
in the text includes facts not contained in the opinion. Compare
principal case at 641. L. testified that he "worked inside the
store," that he took a drill and tires "from the service station"
which was "out of my department." Certified transcript of evi-
dence quoted in Brief for Appellant, pp. 64, 68, 61, 66, Gentry
v. State, - Ind. -, 61 N.E. (2d) 641 (1945). The store
manager testified that "under the rules of the company or under
any of my rules," L. or any other employee "was not privileged to
take any merchandise belonging to our company out of the store
unless it was properly recorded." Id. at 93. L. admitted he had
not obtained requisitions. Id. at 68, 96.
The embezzlement statute specifies a misappropriation by
an employee of the employer's' property to which he has access,
control or possession "while in such employment." Ind. Stat. Anno.
(Burns' 1933) 10-1704. The statute incorporates the crime of
larceny by servant, making the nebulous distinction betwen cus-
tody and possession relatively unimportant. State v. Wingo, 89
Ind. 204 (1863). The determinative question is whether "the
property at the time of the conversion is rightfully in the control
or possession of the wrongdoer, by virtue of his employment."
Wynegar v. State, 157 Ind. 577, 580, 62 N.E. 38 (1901); Note
(1921) 11 A.L.R. 801. The property must be obtained within the
scope of employment. Colip v. State, 153 Ind. 584, 55 N.E. 739(1899); Bowen v. State, 189 Ind. 644, 128 N.E. 926 (1920). The
conversion must occur during the employment. Wynegar v. State,
supra at 580.
In the instant case, it is submitted that no special trust
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element of the crime charged had not been established. 5 The defend-
ant had been convicted for a crime of which he was innocent. The
fact that he was guilty of another and similar offense which might
have been charged is legally irrelevant; the conviction was contrary
to law.6
The court preferred, however, to justify the reversal on the ground
of variance.7 In Indiana, a variance "which does not tend to prejudice
the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits" is to be
deemed immaterial.S Whether a variance affects substantial rights
is to be determined by reference to the principles underlying the gen-
eral rule of criminal procedure that allegations and proof must cor-
respond; namely (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as
to "the nature and cause of the accusation against him," so that he
may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise
by the evidence offered in trial; 9 and (2) that he may be protected
existed regarding property taken from departments other than
L.'s own; property taken after closing hours is not taken "during
employment." Similar fact situations have supported convictions
for larceny rather than embezzlement. Marcus v. State, 26 Ind.
101 (1866); Com. v. Davis, 104 Mass. 548 (1870); Com. v. Barry,
116 Mass. 1 (1874); Zysman v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. Rep. 432, 60
S.W. 669 (1901); Note (1940) 125 A.L.R. 373: 87 Am. St. Rep.
19 (1902); 88 Am. St. Rep. 559 (1903). The rationale most con-
sistent with the embezzlement statute is that the physical posses-
sion was not obtained within the scope of employment; many of
the cases cited in the annotations depend on the trespass to the
constructive possession of the master by a servant having merely
custody. The recent decision of Warren v. State, - Ind. -
62 N.E. (2d) 624, is in the same category. "The facts in Gentry
v. State, supra, clearly distinguish it from the case at bar." Id.
at 625. It is submitted that the facts reported in the opinion do
distinguish the cases but that the facts certified from the trial
court afford no clear ground for distinction.
5. Davis v. State, 196 Ind. 213, 147 N.E. 766 (1925).
6. Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N.E. 930 (1895); Luther v. State,
177 Ind. 619, 98 N.E. 640 (1912).
7. Principal case at 642.
8. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) § 9-1127 el. 10. Thirty-one states
have comparable legislation. This type of legislation reflects a
relaxation of the rigor of old common law rules of criminal plead-
ing which made any variance fatal. The earlier rules "were
merely artifices of mercy developed not to protect innocence, but
to shield guilt from the unjustifiable savagery of the common
law." Kavanagh, "Improvement of Administration of Criminal
Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power" (1925) 11 A.B.A.J. 217,
220. For discussions of the practices culminating in such legis-
lation see Perkins, "Absurdities of Criminal Procedure" (1926)
11 Iowa L. Rev. 297; Pound, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfac-
tion with the Administration of Justice" (1906) 29 A.B.A.Rep. 395.
9. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Ind. Const. Art I, § 13. "The words
'nature and cause of the accusation' have a well-defined meaning,
• . . that meaning is that the gist of an offense shall be charged in
direct and unmistakable terms." Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 447,
124 N.E. 458 (1919); "For this, facts are to be stated, not con-
clusions of law alone. A crime is made up of acts and intent;
and these must be set forth . . ." United States v. Cruiksbank,
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against another prosecution for the same offenselo Accordingly, a
variance is not prejudicial where allegations and proof substantially
correspond, or where the variance is not of a character which "could
have misled the accused on trial," or where the allegation is sur-
plusage." A variance is prejudicial whenever the indictment or in-
formation charges a specific offense and the proof establishes com-
mission of a different crime not included in that charged.12
When tested by the basic principles stated above, the latter rule
seems in at least two situations to result in an insistence upon tech-
nicality at the cost of substantial merit: (1) where a single trans-
action may constitute one of several (as opposed to one or more)
related offenses depending upon elements external to the immediate
fact situation;' 3 and (2) where subdivisions are found to exist within
crimes having the same gist.14 The instant case illustrates both sit-
92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
82 (1935); cf. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) § 9-1104.
10. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935); Edwards v.
State, 220 Ind. 490, 494, 44 N.E. (2d) 304, 306 (1942). See gen-
erally, Millar, "The Function of Criminal Pleading" (1922) 12
J. Cr. L. & Crim. 500.
11. E.g. in the offense of receiving stolen goods.. Substantial corre-
spondence: Miller v. State, 165 Ind. 566, 76 N.E. 245 (1905) (de-
scription of property received). Not misleading: Marco v. State,
188 Ind. 540, 547, 125 N.E. 34, 40 (1919) (conviction for re-
ceiving stolen goods affirmed as against contention that variance
existed because property had been taken by robbers; the con-
ceded variance was "not erroroneous as being misleading, un-
certain or ambiguous.") (distinguishable from principal case on
ground that robbery includes larceny). Surplusage: Blum v. State,
196 Ind. 675, 148 N.E. 193 (1925)) (value of property received).
See generally Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 83 (1935).
12. For Justice Marshall's reasons see The Hoppet v. United States,
7 Cranch 389, 394 (U.S. 1813); Note (1931) 73 A.L.R. 1484.
13. E.g. the external element distinguishing embezzlement from lar-
ceny is the employment relation; that fact of employment is within
the peculiar knowledge of the employee. Assuming that he has
been charged with feloniously taking the goods of X whom he
cannot but know to be his employer, it is difficult to see how he
could be misled on trial by introduction of evidence of his em-
ployment, i.e. why allegation of act and intent is not sufficient
information as to the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him. Where the offenses are mutually exclusive, a con-
viction for one is a bar to prosecution for the other on the same
transaction. See Orfield, "Federal Criminal Appeals" (1936) 4.5
Yale L. J. 1223; Miller "Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases"
(1927)) 36 Yale L. J. 486. In such situations, both requirements
are met. When, however, one or more distinct crimes are com-
mitted by the same transaction, the requirement for a valid plea
of double jeopardy does not generally exist as against a subse-
quent charge of the different offense. See Horack, "The Mul-
tiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act" (1937) 21 Minn. L.
Rev. 805. The second requirement is not met.
14. E.g. the Indiana decisions (1) that a conviction under a general
statute cannot be sustained when the evidence establishes violation
of a more specific statute. Robertson v. State, 207 Ind. 374, 192
N.E. 887 (1934) criticized in Note (1935) 10 Ind. L. J. 467; Note
(1921) 12 A.L.R. 603. (2) that, if the statute defines two sep-
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uations. The absence of prejudice in fact 15 does not, however, warrant
sustaining a conviction for one offense because the accused is guilty
of another. The principle that all material elements of the crime
charged must be established to justify conviction must not be relaxed.
While, on the one hand, the present decision represents a worth-
while effort to preserve important principles, on the other hand, it
raises serious problems that result from confused substantive law. The
solution lies in legislative simplification of the definitions of crimes.16
arate or distinct offenses, a conviction founded upon violation of
one section cannot be sustained upon proof of violotion of the
other. Rogers v. State, 220 Ind. 374, 44 N.E. (2d) 343 (1942),
143 A.L.R. 1074, 1076 (1943). Cf Todd v. State, 31 Ind. 514
(1869). Contra: United States v. Nixon, 235 U.S. 231 (1914);
Maresca v. United States, 277 Fed. 727 (C.C.A. 2d 1921). Notes
(1932) 76 A.L.R. 1534.
15. Consider: the defendant was definitely informed as to what acts
of his were the ground for the accusation. He could not have
been misled on trial. Marco v. State, 188 Ind. 540, 125 N.E. 34
(1919). The prosecutor need not have alleged either the name of
the person who wrongfully obtained the property or the manner
in which it was obtained. Semon v. State, 158 Ind. 55, 62 N.E.
625 (1902); Werthheimer & Goldberg v. State, 201 Ind. 572, 169
N.E. 40 (1929), 68 A.L.R. 179, 187 (1930). On subsequent trial,
the defendent would be sentenced under the statute entitled "Re-
ceiving Stolen Goods" and subjected to the identical punishment
imposed. The gist of the offense-feloniously receiving property
wrongfully obtained by another-remained identical whether the
property had been stolen or embezzled.
16. § 5 of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 (7 Edw. VII, c. 23)
allows the Court of Criminal Appeal to substitute for the jury's
verdict a verdict of another offense, if it appears that the jury
found facts warranting such a verdict. Lawson and Keedy,
"Criminal Procedure in England" (1910) 1 J. Cr. L. & Grim. 595,
748. Several States have comparable legislation, but the courts
have consistently interpreted the provision conservatively. Note
1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 211. There is authority that such a change
in the "nature of the offense charged" would be unconstitutional.
Notes (1920) 7 A.L.R. 1516. This is indicative that an effective
solution must be by revision of the initial definitions. E.g. the
instant result would not have occurred under a statute which
specified merely that the property received must have been un-
lawfully obtained by another. The area of greatest substantive
confusion remains the various allied property offenses. Notes:
"Larceny, Embezzlement and Obtaining Property by False Pre-
tenses" (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 318; Note (1942) 11 Fordham L.
Rev. 323; Beale, "The Borderland of Larceny" (1892) 6 Harv.
L. Rev. 244. A statutory amalgation of the crimes of larceny,
embezzlement, false pretenses, etc. under the cognomen of theft
seems the most satisfactory method to relieve courts from ques-
tions arising from the contentions that the evidence shows com-
mission of an offense similar to, but distinct from, that charged.
E.g. Cal Penal Code (Deering's 1931) 484 ff. A statement of the
facts constituting the offense becomes sufficient charge of the
cause against the defendant. In Indiana, permissive joinder of
different charges arising from the same transaction is deemed
adequate to reconcile effective administration with protection to
innocence. Cooprider v. State, 218 Ind. 122, 31 N.E. 53, 132
A.L.R. 553, 557 (1941). Multiple charging of property offenses
submitted to the jury without necessity of election by the state
and presumptions of a verdict to the valid count indicate practical
elimination of the technical distinctions and the desirability, on
other grounds, for the simplification suggested.
